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Abstract 
 
Using the mandatory disclosure of detected corporate tax evasion cases in China, we examine 
the types of publicly listed firms that evade taxes. We use a bivariate probit model to account 
for the partial observability of tax evasion. Our regression results are different from those 
using the reduced form probit model that ignores the partial observability of tax evasion. Our 
results are also different from those of prior research on the determinants of corporate tax 
avoidance using the effective tax rate (ETR) as a proxy for tax avoidance, suggesting that 
ETR may not be a good proxy for aggressive tax avoidance. 
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1. Introduction 
 The objective of this study is to provide an empirical examination on the types of 
publicly listed firms that engage in tax evasion. Corporate tax evasion, which represents 
intentional actions at the most aggressive end of the corporate tax avoidance continuum, is a 
worldwide problem. In addition to its direct impact on the tax revenues lost, tax evasion 
could cause significant horizontal inequity and efficiency losses, resulting in taxpayers’ 
distrust in a nation’s tax system (Feldstein 1999; 2008). Despite its importance and interest 
for research and tax policy, tax evasion remains an under-explored area in empirical research 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Prior research in accounting and finance identifies firm-
specific determinants of cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance using measures 
constructed from financial statement tax expenses or cash taxes paid (e.g., Manzon and 
Plesko 2002; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008), but few studies have examined the types 
of firms that engage in tax evasion (Slemrod 2007).
1
 We fill this void in the literature by 
identifying the types of publicly listed firms that evade taxes using a novel dataset from 
China and a new empirical methodology that deals with the partial observability of tax 
evasion. 
 There are two key reasons for the lack of research on tax evasion. First, there is little 
publicly available data on detected corporate tax evasion cases in most countries. For 
example, in the U.S. tax examinations are performed in secrecy and firms are not publicly 
identified even when they are charged with tax deficiencies under the IRS audit (Graham and 
Tucker 2006). Corporate disclosure of tax-related events is voluntary in nature and thus 
exhibits substantial cross-sectional variation in terms of completeness. For example, Gleason 
and Mills (2002) find that firms often fail to disclose IRS claims for tax deficiencies. Blouin, 
Gleason, Mills, and Sikes (2010) find that not all firms disclose the dollar value of a tax 
                                                          
1
 Slemrod (2007) provides a comprehensive discussion of the development of tax evasion literature.  
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settlement. In the case of a large tax payment recorded on a firm’s financial statements, the 
firm is often not forthcoming about the reasons (Bauer and Klassen 2017). 
 Second, many corporate tax evasion activities remain undetected due to their inherent 
secrecy or inadequate enforcement by the resources-constrained tax authority. As suggested 
in Shevlin (2002), an ideal tax shelter is one that is not (easily) detectable. Hence, the 
observed tax evasion cases could represent the tip of the iceberg (referred to as the partial 
observability problem) and it is econometrically challenging to model the determinants of 
corporate tax evasion using only observed tax evasion cases.   
 We test our research question in China because publicly listed Chinese firms have 
been mandated to disclose all detected tax evasions via tax adjustments in their annual reports 
since 2002. Our novel dataset covers comprehensive cases of tax evasion that are 
economically significant: the dollar amount of evaded taxes for our sample has a mean 
(median) of approximately RMB 12.2 million (4.2 million) and ranges from RMB 10,000 to 
about RMB 170 million. Among firms that were imposed a monetary penalty, the mean 
(median) dollar amount of the penalty is RMB 1.5 million (1.59 million). To deal with the 
partial observability of corporate tax evasion, we use a bivariate probit model to 
simultaneously model the determinants of corporate tax evasion (referred to as the 
commitment model) and the determinants of corporate tax evasion detection conditional on 
the occurrence of a tax evasion (referred to as the detection model).  
 With regard to our commitment model, we use the motivation-ability-opportunity 
framework from the criminology literature to select our explanatory variables, referred to as 
MOTIVATION, ABILITY, and OPPORTUNITY.
2
 With regard to MOTIVATION, we take 
advantage of our unique setting by examining the effect of government ownership (i.e., state-
controlled enterprises (SOEs) vs. non-SOEs) on tax evasion (e.g., Tang, Mo, and Chan 2017). 
                                                          
2
 Wilde and Wilson (2018) adopt a similar conceptual framework in their review of corporate tax avoidance. 
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We also include a comprehensive list of proxies for other tax evasion incentives based on 
prior research, including corporate income and non-income tax rates, alternative tax shields 
resulting from a firm’s capital structure and business model (e.g., leverage, PPE), and 
incentives resulting from financing and external product market competition (e.g., Graham 
and Tucker 2006; Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang 2014; Kubick, Lynch, Mayberry, and Omer 
2015). We use firm size and accounting profitability to proxy for a firm’s tax evasion ability 
(ABILITY). With regard to OPPORTUNITY, we are interested in the effects of a firm’s 
external corporate governance quality, including external auditor’s quality, past tax 
enforcement intensity, and overall local law enforcement quality (McGuire, Omer, and Wang 
2012; Chan, Luo, and Mo 2016; Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman 2012). While we attempt to 
develop distinctive proxies for each of the three theoretical constructs, we wish to emphasize 
in advance that some of the empirical proxies could represent more than one construct and 
therefore their coefficients should be interpreted with caution.  
 We consider two types of explanatory variables for the detection model. First, we 
consider incentive factors that may facilitate or impede the detection of tax evasion, including 
ownership structure, auditor quality, overall local law enforcement quality, and public 
pressure (e.g., McGuire et al. 2012; Chan et al. 2016; Dyreng, Hoopes, and Wilde 2016). 
Second, we examine the impact of the concurrent tax enforcement intensity on detection 
(Hoopes et al. 2012). 
 With regard to the commitment model, we find evidence consistent with the 
motivation-ability-opportunity framework. We wish to highlight the following three key 
results. First, SOEs are more likely to evade taxes than non-SOEs. Second, high quality 
auditors help reduce the likelihood of corporate tax evasion. Third, we find no evidence that 
past tax enforcement intensity has a deterrence effect on corporate tax evasion, but there is 
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strong evidence that a region’s overall law enforcement quality is negatively associated with 
tax evasion.  
 With regard to the detection model, we find three key results. First, as expected, both 
the government’s concurrent tax enforcement intensity and overall local law enforcement 
quality have a positive impact on tax evasion detection. Second, tax evasion is more likely to 
be detected when a firm employs a high quality audit firm. Third, conditional on the firms 
that have committed a tax evasion, SOEs are less likely to be detected than non-SOEs. 
Overall, the results for the detection model are consistent with those for the commitment 
model. 
 To demonstrate the importance of adopting a bivariate probit model, we also run a 
reduced form probit model of tax evasion without considering the possibility of undetected 
tax evasion. We find that inferences change significantly using this reduced form probit 
model. For example, we no longer find evidence that SOEs or firms employing lower quality 
auditors are more likely to evade taxes. This latter finding may not be surprising because the 
effects of ownership structure and audit quality go in opposite ways in the commitment 
model and detection model and hence these effects would be netted out in the reduced form 
probit model. 
 To provide further support for the importance of ownership structure (SOEs vs. non-
SOEs) in corporate tax evasion, we also examine the impact of ownership structure on the 
magnitude of penalties for detected tax evasion. We find that even if caught for tax evasion, 
SOEs are subject to smaller penalties than non-SOEs. Overall, this result along with the 
results from the commitment and detection models are consistent with the following 
hypotheses: (1) SOEs are more likely to evade taxes than non-SOEs; (2) conditional on 
committing a tax evasion, SOEs are less likely to be detected for tax evasion than non-SOEs; 
and (3) even if caught for tax evasion, SOEs are less likely to be punished than non-SOEs.   
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 We contribute to the tax literature in several important ways. First, we contribute to 
the broad literature on corporate tax avoidance. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) conceptualize 
corporate tax avoidance along a continuum that ranges from perfectly legal strategies (e.g., 
investment in tax exempt municipal bonds) at one extreme to illegal strategies such as tax 
evasion at the other. Due to lack of data, most existing tax research examines legal corporate 
tax avoidance or does not distinguish legal tax avoidance from illegal (or aggressive) tax 
avoidance. We contribute to this broad literature by identifying the types of publicly listed 
firms that evade corporate taxes and showing preliminary evidence that drivers of tax evasion 
are different from the drivers of legal tax avoidance.  
 Our second contribution is to the stream of research that focuses on the most 
aggressive types of tax avoidance (e.g., Graham and Tucker 2006; Wilson 2009; Chan, Lin 
and Mo 2010; Lisowsky 2010; Brown 2011; Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt 2013). These 
studies overcome the data limitation on aggressive tax avoidance by using either confidential 
data from the IRS (e.g., Lisowsky 2010; Lisowsky et al. 2013) or searching Tax Court 
dockets and news articles (e.g., Graham and Tucker 2006; Wilson 2009). Studies relying on 
confidential IRS data limit subsequent replication and follow-up studies while studies relying 
on voluntarily disclosed tax sheltering activities suffer from potential biases resulting from 
data omission. We extend this literature in several important ways. First, we have a complete 
list of detected corporate tax evasion cases that are required to be publicly announced in 
annual reports. Second, we are the first study to simultaneously model the commitment and 
detection of tax evasion which is observable only if detected and disclosed. 
 Our third contribution is to the literature on the deterrence effects of tax enforcement. 
Hoopes et al. (2012) show that stricter tax enforcement helps deter tax avoidance of publicly 
traded U.S. firms. We find no evidence that past tax enforcement deters tax evasion, even 
though concurrent tax enforcement does lead to greater detection of tax evasion. While it is 
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beyond the scope of this study to reconcile the different results between Hoopes et al. and this 
study, we do notice a key difference between the two studies: Hoopes et al. use the cash ETR 
(effective tax rate) to proxy for tax avoidance and hence their proxy is more likely to capture 
both legal and aggressive tax avoidance; in contrast, we examine tax evasion, the most 
serious form of tax avoidance.
3
 In addition, Chinese firms face a much weaker legal 
enforcement environment and therefore it is possible that the deterrence effect of tax 
enforcement may not be as significant as in the U.S.  
 Finally, we extend the extant tax evasion literature, which is largely limited to U.S. 
firms, to China, a country with a weak institutional environment and rampant tax evasion. We 
show that Chinese SOEs are more likely than non-SOEs to not only evade taxes but also 
avoid detection of tax evasion. This finding is significant because there is a widely held belief 
that Chinese SOEs have no incentives to evade taxes simply because both the dividends and 
taxes paid by the SOEs belong to the government. Our finding is consistent with Tang et al. 
(2017) but opposite to those from Bradshaw, Liao, and Ma (2018) and Jian, Li, and Zhang 
(2013) that use the ETR as a tax avoidance proxy. An important contribution of our study is 
to reconcile these conflicting findings by highlighting the differences between legal tax 
avoidance from illegal (aggressive) tax avoidance. In particular, we find that an imputed tax 
evasion probability is positively correlated with the ETR, suggesting that ETR may not be a 
reliable proxy for tax evasion, the most aggressive form of tax avoidance.  
                                                          
3
 Prior research has studied the limitations of ETR as a proxy for aggressive tax avoidance. Hanlon (2003) and 
Schwab, Stomberg, and Xia (2018) discuss how the inherited differences between tax rules and financial 
accounting give rise to distortions in using ETR as a measure of firms’ tax liability or tax avoidance. Dhaliwal, 
Gleason, and Mills (2010) and Comprix, Mills, and Schmidt (2012) show that firms’ financial reporting 
behaviors can add another layer of measurement error as the tax expense account is often used to manage 
earnings.  De Simone et al. (2018) and Henry and Sansing (2018) suggest how the standard procedure of data 
truncation and the elimination of loss firms in computing ETR-type proxies can affect the inferences of the 
results. Using confidential tax return data from the IRS, Lisowsky et al. (2013) show that none of the commonly 
used tax proxies, including both the GAAP ETR and cash ETR, reflect US firms’ participation in reportable and 
listed transactions. Austin (2018) shows that cash ETR mismeasures managers’ intentional tax avoidance 
because of the mechanical relation between cash ETR and the unanticipated tax deduction from employees’ 
stock option exercises.   
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 Since our sample firms are limited to publicly listed Chinese firms, our results may 
not be readily generalizable to other countries with different institutional environments. 
Nevertheless, China and other tax jurisdictions share one commonality: many corporate tax 
evasion cases are never detected. Hence, our key finding on the differences in inferences 
using the reduced form probit model versus the bivariate probit model with partial 
observability should be still highly relevant to other tax jurisdictions.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes our conceptual 
models of corporate tax evasion commitment and corporate tax evasion detection and 
introduces the proxies for each model construct. Section 3 introduces the bivariate probit 
model with partial observability. Section 4 discusses the sample selection procedures and 
data sources. Section 5 presents the regression results for the bivariate probit model with 
partial observability and the common reduced form probit model of corporate tax evasion. 
Section 6 analyzes the determinants of tax evasion penalty and a reconciliation of our results 
with prior tax avoidance studies using ETR as a proxy. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
  We examine two interrelated research questions: (1) What types of publicly listed 
Chinese firms evade taxes (the commitment model)? (2) Limiting to the firms that have 
committed a tax evasion, which firms are more likely to be detected (the detection model)? 
We discuss the relevant explanatory variables and hypotheses for the commitment model in 
section 2.1 and the relevant explanatory variables and hypotheses for the detection model in 
section 2.2. 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160421 
8 
 
2.1. The commitment model 
 To examine the first research question, we adopt the following regression model (firm 
and year subscripts are omitted for brevity):  
 




effectsfixedindustryandyear
YOPPORTUNITABILITYMOTIVATIONEVASION 321*
               (1) 
 
EVASION* is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm year experiences a tax evasion, and 
zero otherwise. Please note that EVASION* is observable only if detected. The choice of 
model (1)’s explanatory variables follows the popular motivation-ability-opportunity 
framework from the criminology literature (Cressey 1953; Braithwaite 1985; Fagan and 
Freeman 1999; Vaughn 1999).
4
 According to this framework, a person’s decision to commit 
a crime depends on whether the person has a motive (e.g., what benefit can the person obtain 
from the act), the ability (e.g., did the person have a gun), and opportunity (e.g., was the 
person at the crime scene). Hence, the explanatory variables include proxies for three sets of 
theoretical constructs: MOTIVATION, ABILITY, and OPPORTUNITY. Due to the multi-
dimensional nature of the three theoretical constructs, we use multiple proxies for each 
construct (see appendix A for all variable definitions). However, we wish to note that some of 
the empirical proxies could represent more than one construct and therefore their coefficients 
should be interpreted with caution. In addition, our predictions are based on existing tax 
avoidance research which does not make a clear distinction between legal tax avoidance and 
illegal tax avoidance. Because of the fundamental differences between these two types of tax 
avoidance activities, there is a possibility that our predictions based on prior research may not 
exactly fit the case of tax evasion. 
 
                                                          
4
 A similar framework is also adopted by studies of accounting frauds (Cooper, Dacin, and Palmer 2014; Davis 
and Pesch 2013; Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham 1989). 
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2.1.1. Proxies for MOTIVATION 
 Our key variable of interest is government ownership. In addition, we include a 
comprehensive list of competing proxies for MOTIVATION based on prior research, 
including corporate tax rates, alternative tax shields, and incentives resulting from financing 
and product market competition. We discuss each set of proxies below. 
 
Ownership structure 
 Taking advantage of our unique setting, we examine the effect of government 
ownership (i.e., SOEs versus non-SOEs) on tax evasion. The effect of government ownership 
on tax evasion is difficult to predict due to multiple countervailing institutional forces. On 
one hand, SOEs may be less aggressive than non-SOEs in tax evasion because both dividends 
to the SOE parent and taxes paid by the SOEs would eventually flow to the government’s 
coffers. Moreover, as the government’s ownership in the publicly listed SOEs is less than 
100%, the controlling shareholder (i.e., the government) may have a stronger preference for 
taxes to dividends. This is because dividends have to be shared with minority shareholders 
while taxes accrue 100% to the government. In addition, both Bradshaw et al. (2018) and Jian 
et al. (2013) argue that SOE managers have an incentive to pay more taxes in order to curry 
favor with government officials who have the ability to influence SOE managers’ promotion 
opportunities. Consistent with this prediction, both Bradshaw et al. (2018) and Jian et al. 
(2013) find that SOEs face higher effective tax rates (an inverse proxy for tax avoidance) 
than non-SOEs. However, neither study examines tax evasion, the most egregious form of tax 
avoidance.  
 On the other hand, there are also reasons to believe that SOEs could be more 
aggressive than non-SOEs in tax evasion. First, rather than a monolithic entity, the Chinese 
government is comprised of a large number of different and equally powerful government 
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agencies with different and often conflicting incentives. For example, the Chinese SOEs are 
subject to the direct supervision of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) who may not share the same agenda as the tax authority. Similarly, 
since more than half of the taxes paid by an SOE are flown to the central government coffer, 
local government officials may not be eager to encourage the SOEs within their jurisdictions 
to pay more taxes (Tang et al. 2017). In addition, each publicly listed SOE has a controlling 
parent company who may have its own personal agenda different from the SASAC and the 
tax authority. Moreover, many Chinese SOEs are known for severe managerial agency 
problems, not only between the top executives and the ultimate controller SASAC but also 
between the top executives and their subsidiary managers. SOE managers and their 
subordinates often have an incentive to pursue empire building and therefore they could have 
a strong desire to reduce taxes in order to have more free cash flows at their disposal (e.g., 
Sun and Feng 2016). This last incentive could be strong because Chinese SOEs were not 
required to turn over most of their free cash flows to the government in the form of dividends 
during our sample period.
5
  
 Second, SOEs have probably the strongest political connection with the government 
and therefore SOEs are always treated more favorably by government agencies. For this 
reason, SOEs are less afraid of being investigated for tax evasion; even if caught with tax 
evasion, SOEs could be less likely to be punished. Consistent with these arguments, Kim and 
Zhang (2016) find that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than non-
connected firms. In the context of China, Lin, Milles, Zhang, and Li (2018) find that political 
                                                          
5
 Chinese SOEs are not required to pay dividends to the government prior to 2007. A 2008 regulation issued by 
the Ministry of Finance states that (i) the SOEs in the select monopoly industries (petroleum, 
telecommunication, coal, electricity, and tobacco) are required to pay a dividend of 10% out of after-tax profit, 
(ii) the state-owned research institutes and military firms are not required to pay any dividend, and (iii) the rest 
of the SOEs are only subject to a 5% dividend rate.  
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connections weaken tax enforcement effectiveness.
6
 In addition, an anonymous official from 
a local tax authority told us that the tax authority faces a much smaller pressure to detect tax 
evasion in SOEs because after all both the SOEs and the tax authority are part of the 
government.  
 Third, the same anonymous tax official told us that SOEs have already shouldered 
many political and social responsibilities on behalf of the government and therefore the tax 
authority may find it much more difficult to strictly enforce the tax code on the SOEs because 
strict tax enforcement could reduce the SOEs’ financial capacity to fulfill many political and 
social responsibilities. Because of these conflicting institutional forces, we do not make any 
predictions for the two ownership structure variables.   
 China has two types of SOEs: SOEs controlled by the central government 
(SOE_CENTRAL) and SOEs controlled by a local government (SOE_LOCAL). Though we do 
not make any ex ante prediction, we consider the two SOE types separately in order to allow 
them to have differential effects on tax evasion.  
 
Corporate tax rates 
 Our next proxy for MOTIVATION is a firm’s tax rates because firms facing a higher 
tax rate may have a stronger incentive to evade taxes (Lin, Mills, and Zhang 2014).
7
 Since 
our tax evasion sample includes both income taxes and non-income taxes, we include the 
following corporate tax rates in the commitment model: the top statutory income tax rate 
(EITRATE), the top statutory business tax rate (BTRATE), and the top statutory value-added 
                                                          
6
 Mills, Nutter, and Schwab (2013) find that the political costs of losing government contracts reduce firms’ tax 
aggressiveness, but contractors with greater bargaining power (i.e., those face less competition for government 
contracts) incur less political costs. 
7
 However, Yitzhaki (1974) argues that tax rate should have no impact on tax evasion if one assumes that the 
penalty for detected evasion is proportional to the tax understated. 
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tax rate (VATRATE).
8
 In addition, we include a dummy variable indicating the presence of net 
operating loss (NOL) as an additional corporate income tax rate proxy. 
  
Alternative tax shields 
 When firms have alternative ways to reduce taxes, they may be less likely to evade 
taxes, implying a substitution effect between tax evasion and alternative tax shields. Hence, 
we control for several alternative tax shields based on prior research. First, we include 
financial leverage (LEV) because Graham and Tucker (2006) find a negative association 
between firms’ tax shelter participation and debt policy, consistent with tax shelters as a form 
of non-debt tax shields. Several other studies also find a negative relation between concurrent 
leverage and various proxies for tax avoidance (Dyreng et al. 2008; Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 
2010).  
 Second, we include the market-to-book ratio (MTB) as a proxy for growth in the 
commitment model because a firm’s motivation for tax avoidance may vary across the firm’s 
growth. In particular, growth firms may devote less resources to tax avoidance activities 
because growth firms have substantial tax deferral opportunities and relatively less taxable 
income to shield (Edwards, Schwab, and Shevlin 2016; Heitzman and Ogneva 2018). 
Consistent with this argument, Klassen, Lisowsky, and Mescall (2016) find that firm’s 
growth, as measured by market-to-book ratio, is negatively associated with firms’ uncertain 
tax benefits, tax shelter participation, and the use of tax havens. Using sales growth as a 
proxy for growth, Robinsion, Sikes, and Weaver (2010) find that firms with higher sales 
growth have higher ETR.
9
  
                                                          
8
 For firm-years after 2007, we are able to calculate the simple average of the firm’s VAT rate based on the 
firm’s industry segments. Our results are not sensitive to using the average VAT rate as an alternative to the top 
statutory VAT rate. 
9
 Some studies have documented a positive association between tax avoidance and firm’s growth using market-
to-book ratio as a proxy (Dyreng et al. 2008; Edwards et al. 2016; Cen, Maydew, Zhang, and Zuo 2017). This 
result is potentially due to the substantial tax deferral opportunities and the heavy use of stock options in 
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 Third, we control for a firm’s capital intensity (PPE). Investment favored economic 
policies such as accelerated depreciation deduction reduce the tax burden for capital intensive 
firms (Gupta and Newberry 1997). Existing literature documents a negative association 
between capital intensity and effective cash tax rates (e.g., Edwards, Schwab, and Shevlin, 
2016; Cen et al. 2017). Because firms with greater capital intensity have lower tax burden, we 
expect those firms to have a lower incentive to engage in tax evasion. 
 Lastly, we include foreign sales (FORESALE) because firms with a greater extent of 
foreign activities enjoy more opportunities through multinational tax planning (Rego 2003; 
Cen et al. 2017). Therefore, all else equal, firms with higher foreign sales should have a lower 
incentive to evade taxes. As we show in Table 3, most Chinese firms have little foreign sales 
and therefore FORESALE may not be a meaningful control in our setting. 
 
Financing  
 We include a dummy variable (SEO) indicating a firm’s current and near future need 
for seasoned equity offerings. Prior research finds that SEO firms have an incentive to engage 
in upward earnings management via real and accrual earnings manipulation (Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong 1998; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Therefore, SEO firms may also have similar 
capital market incentives to engage in tax evasion to boost current period after-tax earnings 
and/or cash flows. However, SEO firms in China may also have less incentive to engage in 
tax evasion because tax evasion, if detected by the securities regulator, would be treated as a 
red flag and therefore could jeopardize the capital raising effort of the firm (CSRC 2001, 
2006).  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
compensation, both of which result in lower cash ETR (Edwards et al. 2016). Austin (2018) shows that cash 
ETR mismeasures managers’ intentional tax avoidance because cash ETR mechanically decreases as the 
unanticipated tax deduction from employees’ stock option exercises increases.   
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Product market competition 
 Finally, we include COMP to capture the impact of product market competition on tax 
evasion. Kubick et al. (2015) find that firms with higher product market power are more tax 
aggressive because these firms are insulated from competitive threats. However, Cai and Liu 
(2009) find that firms in more competitive environments avoid more taxes, consistent with 
the interpretation that competitive forces provide firms with stronger incentives to avoid taxes. 
Because of the conflicting results from prior research, we do not make a prediction for the 
coefficient on COMP. 
 
2.1.2. Proxies for ABILITY 
 We use two proxies for a firm’s ability to evade taxes: LN_SALES and ROA. Mills, 
Erickson, and Maydew (1998) find results consistent with economies of scale in tax planning 
such that larger firms invest more in tax planning. In their analysis of IRS deficiencies 
proposed upon tax audits, Hanlon, Mills, and Slemord (2007) find that the largest companies 
in their sample (those with assets greater than $5 billion) have the greatest percentage of 
firms with a tax deficiency and the highest proposed deficiency rate, consistent with larger 
firms enjoying more tax planning opportunities due to their more complex operations. 
Manzon and Plesko (2002) argue that profitable firms can make more efficient use of tax 
deductions, credits, and exemptions relative to less profitable firms, resulting in greater tax 
avoidance. Rego (2003) also finds that larger, more profitable, and multinational corporations 
exhibit greater tax avoidance than other firms. Consistent with prior research, we expect both 
LN_SALES and ROA to be positively associated with tax evasion.  
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160421 
15 
 
2.1.3. Proxies for OPPORTUNITY 
 We are interested in the effects of a firm’s external governance quality on tax evasion. 
Our first proxy for a firm’s external governance quality is auditor quality (BIGN). We do not 
make a prediction for the coefficient on BIGN due to conflicting institutional forces. On one 
hand, large audit firms could be more sophisticated tax planners and therefore they may be 
able to help their clients design more sophisticated tax avoidance strategies.
10
 Consistent with 
this argument, Treasury (1999) and U.S. Senate (2003) report that firms’ use of tax shelter 
promoters such as Big 5 auditors could be an indication of tax sheltering.  Consistent with 
Big 5 auditors being active tax shelter promoters, Lisowsky (2010) documents a positive 
association between the use of a Big Five auditor and tax shelter use in a sample of firms 
between 2000 and 2004. Using a sample firms that subscribe to auditor-provided tax services, 
McGuire et al. (2012) find that auditors with stronger tax expertise can help their client firms 
achieve greater tax avoidance.  
 On the other hand, aggressive tax avoidance activities may also impose significant 
reputation and regulatory risks to an audit firm (Chan et al. 2016) and therefore big audit 
firms who are more conscious about their reputation capital (Chan and Wu 2011) should have 
a stronger incentive to take actions to reduce such risks. Consistent with this argument, Chan 
et al. (2016) find that high-quality auditors are associated with client firms’ better tax 
compliance in China. Donohoe and Knechel (2014) find a positive association between tax 
aggressiveness and audit fees. Goh, Lim, Shevlin, and Zang (2014) find that the likelihood of 
auditor resignation is higher among firms that are more tax aggressive, consistent with 
auditors’ concerns with reputational and litigation risks related to their clients’ tax 
aggressiveness. Klassen, Lisowsky and Mescall (2016) find that clients of Big 4 tax preparers 
are associated with lower levels of tax avoidance when the tax preparer is also the auditor, 
                                                          
10
 Chinese laws do not prohibit audit firms from providing tax consulting services to their audit clients in our 
sample period. 
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compared to when the tax preparer is not the auditor. In addition, increased corporate 
financial reporting transparency resulting from a tougher auditor may also facilitate other 
stakeholders’ scrutiny of a firm’s questionable tax planning strategies, resulting in a reduction 
in a firm’s tax evasion activities.  
 A firm’s incentive to evade taxes may also depend on the perceived toughness of 
regulatory tax enforcement. Taking advantage of the available data on the government’s tax 
enforcement activities in China, we use the past tax enforcement intensity (TARGET_INDUS 
and TAX_AUDIT) as our second set of proxies for external governance quality. While there is 
considerable uncertainty on whether corporate tax avoidance varies systematically with tax 
enforcement intensity, Hoopes et al. (2012) find that IRS audits deter corporate tax avoidance 
proxied by the cash effective tax rate. Hence, we hypothesize that publicly listed Chinese 
firms are less likely to evade taxes if they are domiciled in provinces with tougher past tax 
enforcement. Our first tax enforcement intensity proxy is TARGET_INDUS, a dummy 
variable indicating the industries that are subject to stricter scrutiny by the tax authority in a 
year. The second tax enforcement intensity is TAX_AUDIT, which measures the amount of 
tax revenues collected as a result of tax audits scaled by the total tax revenues collected in a 
province. To avoid potential endogeneity and consistent with Hoopes et al. (2012), we lag the 
two tax enforcement variables by one year relative to the dependent variable. An untabulated 
analysis shows that the two tax enforcement variables are highly persistent over time. Hoopes 
et al. (2012) show in the U.S. setting that a substantial number of managers use historical data 
provided by the tax authority to gauge tax enforcement.  
 Our third proxy for a firm’s external governance quality is the quality of the overall 
local law enforcement environment (LAW) in the province of a firm’s headquarters. 
Consistent with the argument for the past tax enforcement proxies above, we predict the 
coefficient on LAW to be negative.  
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 In addition to the aforementioned external corporate governance proxies, prior 
research indicates that the extent of a firm’s tax evasion opportunities also depends on the 
firm’s operating environment complexity. We use the number of industry segments 
(SEGMENT) and M&A activities (M&A) to proxy for a firm’s operating environment 
complexity. Firms are better able to shield their tax avoidance activities when their business 
structure is more complex and therefore their true taxable incomes are more difficult to 
determine.  
 One may have noticed that our model (1) does not include the book-tax-difference (or 
other similar tax avoidance proxies) commonly used in prior tax avoidance literature. This is 
because our model (1) is a structural model that attempts to understand the causal drivers of 
tax evasion. On the other hand, the book-tax-difference itself is a consequence of corporate 
tax planning. While the book-tax-difference may be a useful indicator of tax evasion, but it is 
not a causal determinant of tax evasion. Therefore, we exclude the book-tax-difference from 
our commitment model. 
 
2.2. The detection model 
 Conditional on the firms that have committed a tax evasion in a year, our second 
research question examines the types of firms that are more likely to be detected for tax 
evasion. Specifically, we adopt the following model (firm and year subscripts are omitted for 
brevity): 
  effectsfixedindustryandyearXEVASIONDETECTION *|                  (2) 
 
DETECTION is a dummy variable that equals one if a tax evasion committed in year t is 
subsequently detected by the tax authority or others. It is important to note that model (2) is 
tested conditional on using only the firms that have committed a tax evasion, regardless of 
whether a researcher can observe such tax evasion. Hence, explanatory variables that help 
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identify tax evasion firms only are no longer needed and should be excluded from model (2). 
For example, LEV could causally affect the likelihood of tax evasion. However, since model 
(2) starts with the tax evasion firms, it is no longer necessary to include LEV in model (2) 
again, unless we argue that LEV also has a separate effect on detection. For the same reason, 
model (2) should not include the non-causal indicators for tax evasion proposed by the extant 
tax avoidance literature (e.g., the book-tax-difference). 
 For model (2), we are interested in the effects of incentive factors that may facilitate 
or impede the detection of tax evasion, including ownership structure (SOE_CENTRAL and 
SOE_LOCAL), auditor quality (BIGN), overall local law enforcement quality (LAW), and 
public pressure (ETR). As argued in section 2.1, SOEs have a strong political connection with 
the government and therefore we expect the SOEs who have committed a tax evasion to be 
less likely detected. As argued in section 2.1, we expect big audit firms to deter their audit 
clients from committing tax evasion. However, even if audit clients do commit a tax evasion, 
the presence of a big audit firm may also help facilitate the tax authority’s or other monitors’ 
detection of such tax evasion due to more transparent financial reporting required by high 
quality audit firms. Similarly, we also expect the tax authority to find it easier to detect tax 
evasion in a stronger law enforcement environment (LAW). Finally, we include ETR as a 
proxy for public pressure because firms with lower ETR, which is readily observable to 
external parties, tends to attract more public attention and therefore the tax authority may be 
under greater pressure to investigate such firms. 
 As controls, we also examine the impact of the concurrent tax enforcement intensity 
(proxied by TARGET_INDUS and TAX_AUDIT) on detection. Because tax audits are 
typically performed after the submission of a company’s tax return, all these enforcement 
proxies are measured one year after the dependent variable. We predict the coefficients on 
TARGET_INDUS and TAX_AUDIT to be positive. Finally, we include LN_SALES as a 
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control for size related effects because larger firms are likely subject to more frequent and 
routine audits (Hoopes et al. 2012). In addition, we include year and industry fixed effects. 
 
3. Research method 
 One empirical challenge to estimating the models (1) and (2) is that EVASION* is not 
always observable and therefore models (1) and (2) cannot be estimated directly. Prior tax 
evasion studies simply ignore this problem and instead use a reduced form of model (1) by 
substituting the detected tax evasion for EVASION*. Since no one knows for sure the size of 
EVASION*, it remains unknown how severe the bias is resulting from using the reduced form 
model (1). In addition, to our knowledge, no prior studies could estimate model (2) due to the 
partial observability of EVASION*. 
 In this study we address this partial observability problem by estimating models (1) 
and (2) simultaneously using the bivariate probit model with partial observability. Non-linear 
models like our bivariate probit model do not require the exclusion restriction for model 
identification because identification is achieved by its functional form (e.g., Heckman 1979; 
Dong 2010; Escanciano, Jacho-Chavez, and Lewbel 2016; Gerakos, Hahn, Kovrijnykh, and 
Zhou 2016; Li, Poskitt, and Zhao 2017; Greene, Harris, Srivastava, and Zhao 2018). 
Nevertheless, as shown below, we do impose the exclusion restriction in our model to ensure 
that the model is better identified on data (Greene et al. 2018). 
 
4. Sample selection procedures and data sources 
Table 1 reports the sample selection procedures. We begin with an initial sample of 
11,981 firm-years for all publicly listed Chinese firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges from 2003 to 2010. We exclude financial firms due to their unique industry and 
regulatory differences. We start from 2003 because this is the first year when the CSMAR 
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database starts to collect the original texts of accounting error adjustments from annual 
reports that are used to determine the tax evasion cases.
11
 The tax evasion data discussed in 
details below show that the time gap between the beginning year of a tax evasion case and the 
subsequent restatement year of the tax evasion is about 2.3 years, on average. Since we 
started the project in 2013, we end our sample in 2010 to avoid understating the disclosed tax 
evasion cases for the last few years of the sample period.  
We obtain firm-level financial data, including auditor and ownership information, from 
the CSMAR database. We obtain firm income tax rate data from the IFIND database, another 
major database on publicly listed Chinese companies. We exclude 1,804 observations with 
missing values for the variables used in the analysis, resulting in a sample of 10,177 
observations.  
Our empirical analyses also require relevant country and province-level variables. We 
collect the data on tax enforcement measures from the State Administration of Taxation and 
Tax Bureaus, and the data on legal enforcement from the National Economic Research 
Institute (NERI) (Fan, Wang, and Zhu 2011).
 12
 The requirement of non-missing country and 
province-level information further reduces the sample size to 8,768 observations.  
We identify the tax evasion firm years using the CSMAR database’s original texts of the 
accounting error adjustments as disclosed in annual reports for all the years since 2003. We 
also use the IFIND database as a supplemental source for accounting error adjustments that 
could have been missed by the CSMAR database. Appendix B shows an example of the tax 
related accounting error adjustments disclosed in the annual report. These disclosed tax 
related financial statement adjustments represent the final settlement between a firm and a 
                                                          
11
 All publicly listed Chinese firms have been required to disclose accounting error adjustments, including tax 
adjustments, in their annual reports since 2002. 
12
 The legal enforcement index, our measure of law enforcement, is a sub-index of NERI indices, reflecting the 
strength of law enforcement for each province (Fan et al. 2011; Jian and Wong 2010; Wang, Wong, and Xia 
2008).  
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relevant tax authority, which must be disclosed in a tax enforcement decision issued by a tax 
authority.
13
   
From the accounting error adjustment disclosures, we manually identify the tax 
adjustments due to tax evasion between 2003 and 2010 using the following procedures. Our 
discussions with relevant corporate insiders and anonymous tax officials confirm that our 
procedures for identifying tax evasion are reasonable. First, we identify all the firm years 
involving tax adjustments. Second, we exclude the tax adjustments due to the following 
reasons unrelated to tax evasion: (i) tax adjustments due to the delayed approval or 
disapproval of tax deductions or exemptions by the relevant tax authorities (e.g., the 
recognition or derecognition of high-tech company status for tax purposes); (ii) routine year-
end tax adjustments by the tax authority resulting from errors in estimated income taxes; and 
(iii) negative adjustments due to tax overpayment.
14
 Our final tax evasion sample contains 
336 firm-years for 178 unique firms over the period 2003-2010, representing 3.8% of the full 
sample in Table 1.
15
  
Panel A of Table 2 shows the frequency of detected tax evasion by year in our sample 
period. Except for the last two years, the tax evasion percentage hovers around 4% each year. 
                                                          
13
 The administrative procedures for determining a tax evasion case in China involve the following key 
sequential steps: (i) a tax authority issues a notice of tax deficiency along with the related penalties for a tax 
evasion (tuoshui and loushui in Chinese pinyin); (ii) a firm either accepts the verdict or appeal the case to a 
higher level tax authority; and (iii) if the firm is still not satisfied with the outcome of the appeal, the firm can 
still take the dispute to a court, which is rare in China. It is important to note that the firm is not required to 
make any disclosure or financial statement restatement until the firm has accepted the verdict.  
14
 It is unlikely that the tax evasion cases in our final sample are due to financial reporting incentives. The 
reason is that financial reporting incentives would lead to higher taxable income and therefore higher taxes but 
our tax evasion cases are all about tax understatement. 
15
 Using confidential tax audit adjustment data from China’s tax authorities, several studies (i.e., Chan and Mo 
2000, Chan et al. 2010, Chan et al. 2016, Tang et al. 2017) examine Chinese firms’ tax noncompliance behavior. 
Though not explicitly stated in the papers, after discussing with relevant Chinese tax administration officials, we 
believe the income tax audit adjustments used by these studies are based on the immediate and routine income 
tax audit adjustments performed by the tax authority at the end of the year based on a firm’s submitted annual 
tax return and other supporting documents. This process is known as the settlement and payment process (Hui 
Suan Qing Jiao in Chinese) and such tax adjustments do not necessarily imply tax evasion. In contrast, the tax 
audit adjustments considered in our study occur long after the settlement and payment process because the 
average time gap between the year of tax evasion and the year of restatement for the tax evasion is 2.3 years. 
The long time gap also suggests that the tax adjustments examined in our study are likely related to severe tax 
law violations. 
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The significantly lower tax evasion percentages for the last two years could be due to the fact 
that it takes time for some tax evasion cases to be detected.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the frequency of detected tax evasion by tax type. While 
income tax evasion cases rank first in frequency (41.2%), we also observe significant tax 
evasion cases in value added tax, business tax, housing property tax, among others.   
Panel C of Table 3 shows the frequency of detected tax evasion by detector identity. 
While the majority of the detected tax evasion cases are uncovered by the tax authority, other 
government agencies also played a significant role in detection.
16
 
 
5. Empirical results  
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
 Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the regression variables included in models 
(1) and (2). Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample while Panels B-D the 
descriptive statistics for the central SOEs, local SOEs, and non-SOEs, respectively. For the 
full sample, 4% of the firm years experienced detected tax evasions. 17% of our sample firms 
are central SOEs and 32% are local SOEs. The frequency of detected tax evasion is 3% for 
central SOEs and 4% for both local SOEs and non-SOEs. 
 Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for all the regression variables in 
models (1) and (2) for the full sample. Though not tabulated, we also find that the variables 
TARGET_INDUS, TAX_AUDIT, and LAW all exhibit persistence over time as evidenced by 
the significantly positive correlation for each variable in year t-1 and year t+1.  
 
 
                                                          
16
 6.2% of the tax evasions reported in Panel C of Table 2 are classified as “self-disclosed”, which seems to 
suggest that the detector is the firm itself. However, several tax officials told us that most “self-disclosed” cases 
are actually detected by tax authorities. To reduce the tax penalties for the firms, the tax authorities sometimes 
allow the firms to disclose the detector as “self-disclosed”.  
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5.2. Regression results 
5.2.1. The results for the commitment model 
 Table 5 reports the regression results of models (1) and (2) using the bivariate probit 
model that addresses the partial observability of tax evasion. We report the regression results 
of model (1) in column (1) and the regression results of model (2) in column (2).  
 Let’s first focus on the regression results of model (1) that is based on the motivation-
ability-opportunity framework to explain tax evasion. With regard to MOTIVATION, we find 
that the coefficients on our key variables of interest, SOE_CENTRAL and SOE_LOCAL, are 
both significantly positive, suggesting that both central SOEs and local SOEs are more likely 
to evade taxes than non-SOEs. As for the other incentive variables from prior research, we 
find that the coefficient on LEV is significantly positive, contrary to our prediction. One 
potential interpretation of this positive coefficient is that highly levered firms may face a 
greater need for cash and therefore would have a stronger incentive to resort to aggressive tax 
avoidance behavior. As predicted, high PPE firms are less likely to evade taxes while firms 
in more competitive industries (COMP) are more likely to evade taxes, consistent with Cai 
and Liu (2009). The coefficients on SEO, FORESALE, NOL, MTB, and the three top statutory 
tax rates are all insignificant, though many of the coefficients are in the predicted directions.  
 With regard to ABILITY, we find that LN_SALES is not significant while ROA is 
significantly negative, contrary to our prediction. Similar to our ex post interpretation of LEV, 
one could argue that low ROA firms may face a greater need for cash and therefore would 
have a stronger incentive to evade taxes (Law and Mills 2015; Edwards et al. 2016). 
 With regard to OPPORTUNITY, we find that external corporate governance quality 
helps reduce tax evasion. Specifically, the coefficient on BIGN is significantly negative, 
consistent with the hypothesis that high quality auditors help reduce tax evasion. In addition, 
the significantly negative coefficient on LAW suggests that overall local law enforcement 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160421 
24 
 
quality helps deter tax evasion. However, we find little evidence that past tax law 
enforcement intensity has a deterrence effect of tax evasion because neither of the 
coefficients on TAX_AUDIT and TARGET_INDUS is insignificant. The insignificant 
coefficient is unlikely due to measurement error of TARGET_INDUS because the coefficient 
on the same variable loads as expected in the detection model.  
 
5.2.2. The results for the detection model 
 Column (2) of Table 5 shows the regression results of the detection model conditional 
on the firms that have evaded taxes. We find strong evidence that incentives matter in tax 
evasion detection. Consistent with the results in model (1), we find that the coefficients on 
SOE_CENTRAL and SOE_LOCAL are significantly negative, suggesting that conditional on 
the firms that have committed a tax evasion, both central and local SOEs are less likely to be 
detected. In addition, we find that a firm’s external governance quality matters in tax evasion 
detection. Specifically, firms with high quality audit firms (BIGN) or domiciled in stronger 
legal enforcement environments (LAW) are more likely to be detected for tax evasion. 
However, we find no evidence that public pressure (ETR) affects tax evasion detection. 
 There is also evidence that regulators’ concurrent tax enforcement intensity matters in 
tax evasion detection, as evidenced by the significantly positive coefficients on 
TARGET_INDUS and TAX_AUDIT.  
 
5.2.3. Income tax evasions only 
 The regression results in Table 5 include both income tax evasions and non-income 
tax evasions. As shown in Panel B of Table 2, income tax evasions represent only 41.2% of 
all tax evasions in our sample, even though income tax evasions are the most frequent type of 
tax evasion. Hence, we also replicate the model in Table 5 using income tax evasions only. 
The results are reported in Table 6. The inferences for all the regression variables are 
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qualitatively the same as in Table 5 except for the following few important exceptions. First, 
the coefficients on BIGN in both columns (1) and (2) are still as predicted but they are no 
longer significant. Second, the coefficient on TARGET_INDUS in the detection model 
(column (2)) is still as predicted but no longer significant. Third, the coefficients on EITRATE 
and NOL are now significant and as predicted, suggesting that using income tax evasion 
observations only in Table 6 sharpens the test power of the two income tax evasion incentive 
variables, EITRATE and NOL.   
 
5.2.4. The results for the reduced form commitment model 
 Prior tax evasion research models corporate tax evasion using only the detected tax 
evasion observations, referred to as the reduced form commitment model. Hence, a natural 
question one may ask is whether there are significant differences in inference using the 
reduced form commitment model versus the bivariate probit model with partial observability. 
Column (1) of Table 7 reports the regression results of model (1) where the dependent 
variable is one if there is a detected tax evasion and zero otherwise. Compared with the 
coefficients on the same variables in column (1) of Table 5, we notice that the previously 
significant coefficients on SOE_CENTRAL, SOE_LOCAL, BIGN, COMP and SEGMENT in 
column (1) of Table 5 are no longer significant in column (1) of Table 7. These results 
suggest that we would have drawn substantially different inferences about tax evasion 
determinants had we used the reduced form model.  
 
6. Further analyses 
 One most striking finding from Table 5 that is significantly different from prior 
research is that SOEs are not only more likely to evade taxes but also they are less likely to 
be detected for tax evasion. In this section, we provide further evidence consistent with this 
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finding in section 6.1. In addition, we attempt to directly reconcile our results for the 
ownership structure variables with those from prior research in section 6.2. 
 
6.1. Tax evasion penalties 
 If both SOEs and non-SOEs are caught with tax evasion, which firms are punished 
more severely? The arguments in section 2 would predict SOEs to be less severely punished 
because they have the superior political connection with the government. Table 8 shows the 
OLS regression results for this prediction using only the firm years that have reported a tax 
evasion. Because we use fewer control variables in Table 8, the number of tax evasion 
observations is bigger than that in Table 1. For this sample of 425 firm-years of reported tax 
evasion, the mean (median) dollar amount of evaded taxes is approximately RMB 12.2 
million (4.2 million). For the 33 cases where a monetary penalty is levied, the mean (median) 
dollar amount of the penalty is RMB 1.5 million (1.59 million).  
 The dependent variable is LN_PENALTY, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus 
the amount of tax penalties levied in year t on a firm for committing a tax evasion. Our key 
variables of interest are SOE_CENTRAL and SOE_LOCAL. We include LN_SALES, the 
severity of the tax evasion (LN_EVADEDTAX), dummies for the type of taxes evaded, 
dummies for the tax evasion detectors, and year and industry fixed effects as controls. See 
appendix A for all variable definitions. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficients on 
SOE_CENTRAL and SOE_LOCAL are significantly negative, suggesting that both types of 
SOEs are less likely to be penalized for tax evasion even if they are caught.  
  
6.2. Reconciliation with prior tax avoidance literature 
 Both Bradshaw et al. (2018) and Jian et al. (2013) find that SOEs are less likely to 
avoid taxes than non-SOEs, contrary to our results in Table 5. How can we reconcile these 
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conflicting results? Our study differs from these two studies in two key aspects. First, these 
two prior studies use the effective income tax rate (ETR) as a proxy for tax avoidance while 
we use tax evasion. Because the effective tax rate could reflect the effects of both legal tax 
avoidance and some aggressive (or illegal) tax avoidance, the effective tax rate may not be 
comparable to our tax evasion measure. Second, ETR is readily observable to external parties 
while tax evasion is unobservable unless detected. Hence, SOEs could have lower incentives 
to lower their ETR due to the public pressure while they could become more aggressive in 
evading taxes, which is unobservable to outsiders.  
 To check the correlation between common tax avoidance measures and our tax 
evasion proxy, Table 9 tabulates the summary statistics (panel A) and pairwise Pearson 
correlations (panel B) of the following variables for the full sample as well as the three 
subsamples (central SOEs, local SOEs, and non-SOEs): EVASION (the detected tax evasion), 
PRED_EVASION (the predicted tax evasion probability based on the commitment model in 
column (1) of Table 5), ETR and CashETR per Bradshaw et al. (2018).
17
 See appendix A for 
detailed definitions. There are two key findings. First, the predicted tax evasion frequencies 
are much higher than the observed tax evasion frequencies for both central SOEs and local 
SOEs. Second, the correlation between PRED_EVASION and ETR (or CashETR) is positive 
rather than negative, suggesting that neither ETR nor CashETR is a good proxy for tax 
evasion.  
 We next replicate the ETR model and CashETR model from Bradshaw et al. (2018) 
over our sample period 2003-2010. As shown in column (1) of Table 10, the coefficient on 
SOE is significantly positive, consistent with Bradshaw et al. (2018). In column (2), we break 
down SOE into central- and local- government owned (SOE_CENTRAL and SOE_LOCAL) 
and the results are also consistent with those reported in Bradshaw et al. (2018). Finally, we 
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 Inferences are qualitatively the same if we limit the tax evasions to income tax evasions only (untabulated). 
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estimate the ETR model and CashETR model using the same set of control variables in Table 
5 and we continue to find similar results (see columns (5) to (8)). Overall, these regression 
results provide evidence that ETR and CashETR are unlikely to be good proxies for tax 
evasion, the most aggressive tax avoidance behavior. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 Taking advantage of the mandatory disclosure of detected corporate tax evasions in 
China, we examine the types of publicly listed Chinese firms that evade taxes. To deal with 
the partial observability of corporate tax evasion, we simultaneously model the determinants 
of corporate tax evasion (referred to as the commitment model) and the determinants of 
corporate tax evasion detection conditional on the occurrence of a tax evasion (referred to as 
the detection model) using a bivariate probit model with partial observability. 
 With regard to the commitment model, we find three interesting results. First, SOEs 
are more likely to evade taxes than non-SOEs. Second, the presence of a big audit firm is 
associated with a reduced likelihood of corporate tax evasion. Third, we find no evidence of a 
deterrence effect of past tax enforcement intensity but there is evidence that overall law 
enforcement quality helps reduce tax evasion. With regard to the detection model, we find the 
following interesting results. First, as expected, the tax authority’s concurrent tax 
enforcement intensity and overall local law enforcement quality have a positive impact on tax 
evasion detection. Second, SOEs are less likely to be detected for tax evasion than non-SOEs. 
Third, corporate tax evasion is more likely to be detected when a firm employs a big audit 
firm. Consistent with the results from the bivariate probit model with partial observability, we 
also find that even if caught for tax evasion, SOEs are subject to smaller penalties than non-
SOEs.   
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 Overall, our results are inconsistent with Bradshaw et al. (2018) and Jian et al. (2013) 
who find SOEs to be less likely to avoid taxes than non-SOEs. A key difference between 
these two studies and ours is the definition of tax avoidance. Specifically, we focus on tax 
evasion, the most opaque and egregious form of tax avoidance, but both Bradshaw et al. 
(2018) and Jian et al. (2013) use the effective tax rate (ETR) as a proxy for tax avoidance. In 
addition, ETR is readily observable to external parties while tax evasion is unobservable 
unless detected. Hence, the management of ETR and tax evasion could be quite different. 
While ETR can capture the effect of legal tax avoidance, our results suggest ETR does not 
capture tax evasion. 
 We contribute to the existing tax literature in several important ways. First, we 
contribute to the literature on aggressive corporate tax avoidance by being the first study to 
use a bivariate probit model to simultaneously model the determinants of partially observable 
tax evasion and the determinants of tax evasion detection. We show that taking into 
consideration undetected tax evasion could significantly alter a researcher’s inferences. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on how past tax enforcement affects corporate tax 
avoidance behavior. To our best knowledge, we are one of the first few studies to examine 
how past tax enforcement affects corporate tax evasion. Third, we extend the extant tax 
evasion literature, which is largely limited to U.S. firms, to China, a country with a weak 
institutional environment and rampant tax evasion. We show that Chinese SOEs are more 
likely than non-SOEs to evade taxes, avoid detection even if they have committed a tax 
evasion, and be less severely punished even if they are caught with tax evasion.  
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
Variable name Definition 
EVASION* An indicator variable that equals one if a firm commits a tax evasion 
(regardless of whether the evasion is detected or not) in year t, and 
zero otherwise. 
EVASION An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is caught with a tax 
evasion in year t, and zero otherwise. 
PRED_EVASION The predicted value of the partially observable EVASION* based on 
the bivariate probit model. 
SOE_CENTRAL A dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s ultimate controller is 
the central government, and zero otherwise. 
SOE_LOCAL A dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s ultimate controller is a 
local government, and zero otherwise. 
EITRATE The top statutory income tax rate of the firm. 
BTRATE The top statutory business tax rate of the firm. 
VATRATE The top value-added tax rate of the firm. 
NOL An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm report a net operating 
loss, and 0 otherwise.  
LEV Long-term debt scaled by total assets. 
MTB Market to book ratio, the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity.  
PPE Property /total assets 
FORSALES (%) Foreign sourced income as a percentage of total sales. 
SEO A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a seasoned equity 
offering between year t and year t+2. 
COMP The Herfindahl index of sales in different industries, where higher 
value means lower level of competition. 
LN_SALES Natural logarithm of total sales. 
ROA Pre-tax income divided by total assets. 
BIGN An indicator variable that equals 1 if the company is audited by a Big 
4 firm or one of the Top 10 domestic audit firms in China in a year, 
according to the audit revenue data compiled by The Chinese Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, and zero otherwise. 
TARGET_INDUS An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm year belongs to one of the 
industries that are under stricter scrutiny by the tax authority, and zero 
otherwise. 
TAX_AUDIT The tax revenue collected through tax audit as a percentage of total tax 
revenue for each province year. 
SEGMENT The number of industry segments. This variable is truncated between 0 
and 5, where 5 indicates firms with at least 5 segments. Missing value 
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is coded as 0. 
M&A An indicator variable that equals 1 for merger and acquisition 
activities, and zero otherwise. 
LAW 
 
 
The law enforcement index developed by Fan et al. (2011). Each 
province receives an index value between 0-10 based on the 
province’s law enforcement strength, with larger value of index 
indicates better enforcement. 
ETR Tax expense divided by pre-tax book income. Observations with 
negative pre-tax book income is set to missing. This variable is 
truncated at 0 and 1. 
CashETR Cash income tax paid divided by pre-tax income. 
LN_PENALTY The natural logarithm of one plus the amount of penalty levied on the 
firm for tax evasion committed in year t. 
LN_EVADEDTAX The natural logarithm of the amount of evaded tax for the tax evasion 
committed in year t. 
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Appendix B. An example of accounting adjustments due to detected tax evasion 
disclosed in the annual report (English translations) 
Company name (stock code): Shanxi Xinghuacun Fen Wine Factory Co., Ltd. (600809)    
Year of disclosure: 2003 
According to the “Tax Enforcement Notice 2002” and the “Tax Punishment Notice NO. 036” 
issued by the Inspection Office of Lvliang Local Taxation Bureau, the Company paid back its 
evaded taxes for the years 2000 and 2001 as follows: (i) business tax:  RMB 175,646.25 in 
2001; (ii) urban construction and maintenance tax: RMB 5061.38 in 2001; (iii) educational 
surcharge: RMB 3,036.83 in 2001; (iv) price regulation fund charge: RMB 1,518.4 in 2001; 
(v) property tax: RMB 2,467.97 in 2001 and RMB 2,467.97 in 2000; (vi) stamp duty: 
RMB12,430.37 in 2001 and RMB 8,281.86 in 2000. The Company paid a financial penalty of 
RMB 100,000 for the tax avoidance. The Local Tax Bureau received the payment of past-due 
taxes and the penalty of RMB 310,911.05 in March 2003. Because of the above-mentioned 
adjustments, the Company restated its financial statements, leading to a reduction of RMB 
264,274.40 in the year 2000 beginning balance of the retained earnings and a reduction of 
RMB 45,636.65 in the year 2000 beginning balance of the surplus reserve (including public 
welfare fund of RMB 15,545.55).  
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
 
No. of firm-year 
Observations 
A-share companies between 2003 to 2010 in CSMAR 11,981 
     Less: observations with missing firm-level variables (1,804) 
 10,177 
     Less: observations with missing country and province-level variables (1,409) 
Final sample for the main analysis 8,768 
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Table 2. Sample Distribution 
Panel A. Distribution of Tax Evasion Incidents by Commitment Year 
Year EVASION=1 EVASION=0 
 
Firm-years involving 
a tax evasion 
Percent 
Firm-years involving 
a tax evasion 
Percent 
2003 49 6.0 771 94.0 
2004 49 5.7 813 94.3 
2005 39 4.5 837 95.5 
2006 45 4.7 904 95.3 
2007 51 4.1 1,187 95.9 
2008 38 3.2 1,158 96.8 
2009 38 2.8 1,299 97.2 
2010 27 1.8 1,464 98.2 
Total 336 3.8 8,432 96.2 
 
 
Panel B. Distribution of Types of Tax Evaded 
Tax Evaded  
Percent of Tax Evasion  
Firm-years* 
Enterprise Income Tax   41.2 
Value Added Tax  18.2 
Business Tax  13.8 
Property Tax  12.1 
Urban Land Use Tax  10.7 
Urban Construction and Maintenance 
Tax 
 6.9 
Stamp Duty  6.9 
Education Surcharge  6.2 
Land Value Added Tax  3.8 
Vehicle Usage Tax  1.4 
Tariff  1.2 
Tax Rebate  0.5 
Consumption Tax   0.2 
Others  22.8 
*Do not add up to 100% because a tax evasion firm year may involves more than one 
type of taxes evaded. 
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Panel C. Distribution of Identified Detectors of Tax Evasions 
Identified Detector  
Percent of Tax 
Evasion Firm-years* 
Central Tax Bureau (State Administration of Taxation ) 16.3 
Local Tax Bureau  20.6 
Local or Central Tax Bureau 18.7 
Ministry of Finance 7.6 
Self-Disclosed 6.2 
Department of Audit 4.0 
The Customs 0.9 
SEC 0.7 
Unknown 30.9 
*Do not add up to 100% because a tax evasion firm year may involves more than one 
detecting agencies. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample 
Variable N Mean S.D. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
         
EVASIONt 8,768 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SOE_CENTRALt 8,768 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
SOE_LOCALt 8,768 0.32 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
EITRATEt–1 8,768 0.22 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.24 0.33 0.33 
BTRATEt–1 8,768 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
VATRATEt–1 8,768 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.17 
NOLt 8,768 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LEVt–1 8,768 0.22 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.21 0.32 0.42 
MTBt 8,768 3.69 3.51 1.19 1.68 2.69 4.51 7.08 
PPEt 8,768 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.15 
FORESALEt 8,768 9.10 18.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.86 32.43 
SEOt 8,768 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
COMPt 8,768 0.13 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.30 
LN_SALESt 8,768 20.94 1.38 19.33 20.07 20.89 21.73 22.69 
ROAt 8,768 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.12 
BIGNt 8,768 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
TARGET_INDUSt-1 8,768 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
TAX_AUDITt-1 8,768 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
LAWt-1 8,768 8.05 4.49 3.69 4.67 6.61 10.64 14.23 
SEGMENTt 8,768 2.18 1.59 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 
M&At 8,768 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
TARGET_INDUSt+1 8,768 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ETRt 8,768 0.22 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.19 0.29 0.39 
TAX_AUDITt+1 8,768 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
LAWt+1 8,768 8.82 4.92 3.95 5.11 7.32 12.39 16.61 
         
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. 
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Panel B. Descriptive Statistics for Central SOE Subsample 
Variable N Mean S.D. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
         
EVASIONt 1,494 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SOE_CENTRALt 1,494 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
SOE_LOCALt 1,494 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EITRATEt–1 1,494 0.20 0.07 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.33 
BTRATEt–1 1,494 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
VATRATEt–1 1,494 0.14 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 
NOLt 1,494 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LEVt–1 1,494 0.20 0.16 0.00 0.06 0.18 0.30 0.44 
MTBt 1,494 3.76 3.29 1.27 1.79 2.87 4.56 7.18 
PPEt 1,494 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.14 
FORESALEt 1,494 10.99 19.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.82 40.47 
COMPt 1,494 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.31 
SEOt 1,494 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LN_SALESt 1,494 21.45 1.53 19.62 20.37 21.30 22.34 23.63 
ROAt 1,494 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.12 
BIGNt 1,494 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
TARGET_INDUSt-1 1,494 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TAX_AUDITt-1 1,494 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
LAWt-1 1,494 8.20 4.31 3.81 4.99 7.39 10.64 14.23 
SEGMENTt 1,494 2.04 1.60 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 
M&At 1,494 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LAWt+1 1,494 8.98 4.72 4.28 5.27 7.60 12.39 16.27 
ETRt 1,494 0.19 0.14 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.36 
TARGET_INDUSt+1 1,494 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TAX_AUDITt+1 1,494 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
         
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. 
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Panel C. Descriptive Statistics for Local SOE Subsample 
Variable N Mean S.D. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
         
EVASIONt 2,770 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SOE_CENTRALt 2,770 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SOE_LOCALt 2,770 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EITRATEt–1 2,770 0.23 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.33 0.33 
BTRATEt–1 2,770 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
VATRATEt–1 2,770 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.17 
NOLt 2,770 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LEVt–1 2,770 0.22 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.21 0.32 0.42 
MTBt 2,770 3.37 3.14 1.20 1.64 2.48 4.07 6.27 
PPEt 2,770 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.15 
FORESALEt 2,770 7.41 15.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.09 25.09 
SEOt 2,770 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
COMPt 2,770 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.25 
LN_SALESt 2,770 21.25 1.33 19.63 20.37 21.14 22.05 23.04 
ROAt 2,770 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12 
BIGNt 2,770 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
TARGET_INDUSt-1 2,770 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
TAX_AUDITt-1 2,770 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
LAWt-1 2,770 7.83 4.45 3.48 4.63 6.42 9.07 14.23 
SEGMENTt 2,770 2.25 1.68 0.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 
M&At 2,770 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LAWt+1 2,770 8.58 4.85 3.91 5.04 7.21 11.47 16.61 
ETRt 2,770 0.22 0.15 0.04 0.13 0.20 0.30 0.39 
TARGET_INDUSt+1 2,770 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
TAX_AUDITt+1 2,770 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
         
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. 
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Panel D. Descriptive Statistics for Non-SOE Subsample 
Variable N Mean S.D. p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
         
EVASIONt 4,504 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SOE_CENTRALt 4,504 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SOE_LOCALt 4,504 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EITRATEt–1 4,504 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.33 0.33 
BTRATEt–1 4,504 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
VATRATEt–1 4,504 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 
NOLt 4,504 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LEVt–1 4,504 0.22 0.15 0.00 0.10 0.22 0.33 0.42 
MTBt 4,504 3.86 3.78 1.15 1.68 2.83 4.78 7.69 
PPEt 4,504 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.15 
FORESALEt 4,504 9.50 19.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.54 35.44 
SEOt 4,504 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
COMPt 4,504 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.31 
LN_SALESt 4,504 20.59 1.26 19.10 19.82 20.63 21.38 22.05 
ROAt 4,504 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.13 
BIGNt 4,504 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
TARGET_INDUSt-1 4,504 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
TAX_AUDITt-1 4,504 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
LAWt-1 4,504 8.13 4.58 3.64 4.66 6.61 11.47 14.23 
SEGMENTt 4,504 2.18 1.53 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 
M&At 4,504 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LAWt+1 4,504 8.92 5.01 3.90 5.02 7.32 12.39 17.14 
ETRt 4,504 0.22 0.17 0.03 0.11 0.19 0.30 0.41 
TAX_AUDITt+1 4,504 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
TARGET_INDUSt+1 4,504 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
         
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. 
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Table 4. Correlations 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 
                      
1.  EVASIONt                      
2.  SOE_CENTRALt -0.01                     
3.  SOE_LOCALt 0.02 -0.30                    
4.  EITRATEt–1 0.03 -0.11 0.06                   
5.  BTRATEt–1 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.02                  
6.  VATRATEt–1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03                 
7.  NOLt 0.03 -0.05 -0.09 0.02 -0.06 0.00                
8.  LEVt–1 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.12 -0.23 -0.09               
9.  MTBt -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01              
10. PPEt -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.04 -0.11 0.25 -0.01             
11. FORESALEt -0.02 0.01 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 0.11 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.08            
12. SEOt -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.10 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.03           
13. COMPt -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.00          
14. LN_SALESt -0.04 0.19 0.15 -0.01 0.18 0.01 -0.27 0.17 -0.02 0.10 0.05 0.17 -0.02         
15. ROAt -0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.18 -0.04 0.01 0.21 0.03 0.13 -0.03 0.27        
16. BIGNt -0.04 0.11 -0.06 -0.10 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05       
17. TARGET_INDUSt-1 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.01 -0.13 -0.07 0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.00 -0.02      
18. TAX_AUDITt-1 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10     
19. LAWt-1 -0.09 0.04 -0.03 -0.13 0.05 0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 -0.07 0.14 0.08 -0.01 0.19 0.12 0.21 0.10 -0.25    
20. SEGMENTt 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.16 -0.06 -0.10 0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.07 0.13   
21. M&At -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.09 -0.01 -0.13 0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.17 0.10 0.06 0.07 -0.03 0.10 0.10  
22. ETRt 0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.33 0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.04 -0.16 -0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.00 
                      
This table reports the Pearson correlations among the variables used in the analysis. Correlation coefficients marked in bold are significant at the 0.10 level or better (based 
on two-tailed tests). 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160421 
46 
 
Table 5. Determinants of Corporate Tax Evasion Commitment and Detection: Bivariate 
Probit with Partial Observability Estimation 
 (1) (2) 
 Pr(EVASION*t) Pr(DETECTION | EVASION*t) 
Motivation:   
SOE_CENTRALt 1.2408** -2.0695*** 
 (2.05) (-3.58) 
SOE_LOCALt 0.8021* -1.3327*** 
 (1.89) (-2.69) 
EITRATEt–1 0.1561  
 (0.38)  
BTRATEt–1 2.1450  
 (1.28)  
VATRATEt–1 -0.3611  
 (-0.52)  
NOLt -0.0696  
 (-0.72)  
LEVt–1 0.4614**  
 -1.97  
MTBt -0.0009  
 (-1.37)  
PPEt -1.4669**  
 (-2.18)  
FORESALEt 0.0036  
 (0.28)  
SEOt -0.1373  
 (-1.59)  
COMPt–1 -0.5463**  
 (-2.20)  
Ability:   
LN_SALESt -0.1047 0.1249 
 (-1.48) (0.97) 
ROAt -2.7956***  
 (-3.06)  
Opportunity:   
BIGNt -0.2841* 0.4691** 
 (-1.75) (2.09) 
TARGET_INDUSt–1 -0.0556  
 (-0.48)  
TAX_AUDITt–1 -10.9464  
 (-1.22)  
LAWt–1 -0.1173***  
 (-4.36)  
SEGMENTt 0.0403*  
 (1.81)  
M&At 0.0429  
 (0.64)  
LAWt+1  0.0844* 
  (1.87) 
ETRt  0.1709 
  (0.47) 
TARGET_INDUSt+1  0.6126* 
  (1.82) 
TAX_AUDITt+1  34.9342** 
  (2.56) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Prob > χ2 0.00 
Observations 8,768 
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This table presents the results of a joint estimation of Models (1) and (2) using a bivariate probit model with 
partial observability. Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. z-statistics are in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
adjusted for firm- and year- clustering. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Determinants of Corporate Tax Evasion Commitment and Detection: Income 
Tax Evasions Only 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Pr(EVASIONT*t) Pr(DETECTION | EVASION*t) 
Motivation:   
SOE_CENTRALt 0.9069*** -1.6969*** 
 (2.92) (-2.67) 
SOE_LOCALt 0.4803** -0.9816** 
 (2.26) (-2.54) 
EITRATEt–1 0.5912*  
 (1.68)  
BTRATEt–1 -1.0714  
 (-0.76)  
VATRATEt–1 0.3305  
 (0.47)  
NOL -0.2335*  
 (-1.78)  
LEVt–1 0.4593*  
 (1.85)  
MTBt -0.0001  
 (-0.12)  
PPEt -1.1799*  
 (-1.76)  
FORESALEt 0.0073  
 (0.76)  
SEOt -0.0377  
 (-0.52)  
COMPt–1 -0.5315**  
 (-2.00)  
Ability:   
LN_SALESt -0.1891** 0.4905** 
 (-2.34) (2.28) 
ROAt -1.2371  
 (-1.32)  
Opportunity:   
BIGNt -0.1588 0.1613 
 (-1.23) (0.52) 
TARGET_INDUSt–1 -0.0139  
 (-0.18)  
TAX_AUDITt–1 -5.0975  
 (-0.76)  
LAWt–1 -0.1002***  
 (-5.02)  
SEGMENTt 0.0020  
 (0.18)  
M&At 0.0688  
 (1.12)  
LAWt+1  0.1097*** 
  (2.65) 
ETRt  0.4941 
  (0.96) 
TARGET_INDUSt+1  0.4841 
  (1.26) 
TAX_AUDITt+1  42.0292* 
  (1.75) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Prob > χ2 0.00 
Observations 8,768 
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This table presents the results of a joint estimation of Models (1) and (2) using a bivariate probit model with 
partial observability. We consider only income tax evasion observations. Please refer to Appendix A for variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. z-statistics are in parentheses 
and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm- and year- clustering. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Determinants of Corporate Tax Evasion Commitment and Detection: Single 
Equation Probit Estimation 
 All Evasions 
  
 (1) 
 Pr(EVASIONt) 
Motivation:  
SOE_CENTRALt -0.0740 
 (-0.70) 
SOE_LOCALt 0.0303 
 (0.38) 
EITRATEt–1 0.3047 
 (0.69) 
BTRATEt–1 2.4006 
 (1.07) 
VATRATEt–1 -0.6150 
 (-0.57) 
NOLt -0.0065 
 (-0.06) 
LEVt–1 0.6424* 
 (1.69) 
MTBt -0.0003 
 (-1.47) 
PPEt -1.4494** 
 (-2.17) 
FORESALEt 0.0102 
 (0.38) 
SEOt -0.1154 
 (-1.34) 
COMPt–1 -0.3390 
 (-1.28) 
Ability:  
LN_SALESt -0.0274 
 (-0.94) 
ROAt -2.3998*** 
 (-3.03) 
Opportunity:  
BIGNt -0.0309 
 (-0.39) 
TARGET_INDUSt–1 0.0263 
 (0.25) 
TAX_AUDITt–1 2.1801 
 (0.60) 
SEGMENTt 0.0103 
 (0.66) 
M&At 0.0461 
 (0.78) 
LAWt–1 -0.0556*** 
 (-4.52) 
ETRt 0.1462 
 (0.79) 
  
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 8,768 
Pseudo R
2
 0.06 
  
This table presents the results of probit estimation of Model (1). Please refer to Appendix A for variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. z-statistics are in parentheses 
and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm- and year- clustering. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. OLS Regression Results on the Determinants of Tax Evasion Penalty 
 Dependent variable = 
LN_PENALTYt 
  
LN_SALESt -0.01817 
 (-0.86) 
SOE_CENTRALt -2.5651*** 
 (-4.17) 
SOE_LOCALt -1.1770* 
 (-1.94) 
LN_EVADEDTAX 0.5654*** 
 (3.74) 
Constant -4.9295 
 (-1.06) 
  
Dummies for Types of Evaded Taxes Yes  
Dummies for Detectors Yes  
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 425 
Adjusted R
2
 0.39 
  
This table presents the results of an OLS regression of LN_PENALTY as a function of firm size, ownership, and 
the amount of evaded taxes. Please refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted 
for firm- and year- clustering. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9. A Comparison of Tax Evasion, Predicted Tax Evasion, and Effective Tax Rates 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean SD p10 p25 p50 p75 P90 
        
Full Sample        
EVASIONt 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PRED_EVASIONt 0.14 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.22 0.35 
ETRt 0.22 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.19 0.29 0.39 
CashETRt 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.07 0.16 0.27 0.42 
        
Central SOEs        
EVASIONt 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PRED_EVASIONt 0.28 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.28 0.41 0.49 
ETRt 0.19 0.14 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.36 
CashETRt 0.19 0.18 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.25 0.39 
        
Local SOEs        
EVASIONt 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PRED_EVASIONt 0.19 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.19 0.28 0.37 
ETRt 0.22 0.15 0.04 0.13 0.20 0.30 0.39 
CashETRt 0.22 0.19 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.29 0.45 
        
Non-SOEs        
EVASIONt 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PRED_EVASIONt 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.14 
ETRt 0.22 0.17 0.03 0.11 0.19 0.30 0.41 
CashETRt 0.21 0.21 0.01 0.08 0.16 0.27 0.44 
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Panel B. Pearson Correlations 
This table presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for tax evasion, predicted tax evasion, effective 
tax rates (ETR), and cash effective tax rates (CashETR). The correlations in bold are significant at the 0.10 level 
(based on two-tailed tests). See the appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Variable 1. EVASIONt 2. PRED_EVASIONt 3. ETRt 4. CashETRt 
     
Full Sample     
1. EVASIONt  1.00    
2. PRED_EVASIONt 0.05 1.00   
3. ETRt 0.03 0.02 1.00  
4. CashETRt 0.04 0.03 0.61 1.00 
     
Central SOEs     
1. EVASIONt  1.00    
2. PRED_EVASIONt 0.04 1.00   
3. ETRt 0.06 0.03 1.00  
4. CashETRt 0.08 0.03 0.67 1.00 
     
Local SOEs     
1. EVASIONt  1.00    
2. PRED_EVASIONt 0.07 1.00   
3. ETRt 0.01 0.07 1.00  
4. CashETRt 0.01 0.07 0.59 1.00 
     
Non-SOEs     
1. EVASIONt  1.00    
2. PRED_EVASIONt 0.15 1.00   
3. ETRt 0.04 0.09 1.00  
4. CashETRt 0.05 0.08 0.61 1.00 
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Table 10. Replication of Bradshaw et al.’s (2018) ETR Regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ETRt CashETRt ETRt CashETRt ETRt CashETRt ETRt CashETRt 
         
SOEt 0.0097* 0.0085*   0.0082* 0.0168***   
 (1.86) (1.72)   (1.83) (3.36)   
SOE_CENTRALt   0.0067 0.0177**   0.0018 0.0130* 
   (0.93) (2.28)   (0.29) (1.88) 
SOE_LOCALt   0.0164*** 0.0208***   0.0104** 0.0188*** 
   (2.93) (3.26)   (2.04) (3.28) 
LN_ASSETSt -0.0036 -0.0092*** -0.0043 -0.0107***     
 (-1.40) (-3.87) (-1.57) (-3.85)     
LN_SALESt     0.0027 -0.0002 0.0035* -0.0001 
     (1.45) (-0.10) (1.87) (-0.06) 
FORESALEt -0.0042*** -0.0049*** -0.0046*** -0.0054*** -0.0063*** -0.0069*** -0.0060*** -0.0069*** 
 (-4.18) (-5.11) (-4.64) (-5.09) (-6.67) (-6.69) (-6.35) (-6.63) 
ROAt 0.4330*** 0.3264*** 0.3038*** 0.1502*** 0.2467*** 0.0944*** 0.2529*** 0.0940*** 
 (14.09) (11.24) (8.47) (3.77) (10.21) (3.20) (10.43) (3.18) 
LEVt–1 0.0374** 0.0436*** 0.0408*** 0.0496*** 0.0356 0.0498* 0.0391* 0.0501* 
 (2.49) (2.91) (2.58) (2.83) (1.62) (1.92) (1.78) (1.93) 
MTBt -0.0028*** -0.0038*** -0.0021*** -0.0030*** -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (-5.00) (-6.03) (-3.18) (-3.76) (-0.02) (1.45) (0.05) (1.45) 
PPEt -0.0942*** -0.0180 -0.1026*** -0.0090 -0.1470*** -0.0082 -0.1323*** -0.0091 
 (-2.75) (-0.51) (-2.97) (-0.22) (-4.67) (-0.22) (-4.20) (-0.24) 
NOLt -0.0968*** -0.1169*** -0.1084*** -0.1310*** -0.0556*** -0.0734*** -0.0556*** -0.0733*** 
 (-10.41) (-10.63) (-11.30) (-11.35) (-7.46) (-9.50) (-7.51) (-9.47) 
M&At 0.0028 -0.0034 0.0026 -0.0049 0.0060* -0.0018 0.0073** -0.0017 
 (0.73) (-0.73) (0.68) (-1.04) (1.74) (-0.41) (2.11) (-0.41) 
EQUOFFERt -0.0142*** -0.0368*** -0.0154*** -0.0390***     
 (-3.46) (-6.61) (-3.77) (-6.70)     
CROSSLISTt 0.0014 0.0087 0.0030 0.0109     
 (0.16) (0.93) (0.34) (1.02)     
OWNCONCENt -0.0270 -0.0180 -0.0194 -0.0122     
 (-1.63) (-1.17) (-1.13) (-0.64)     
MGMTOWNt -0.0038 -0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0013     
 (-0.80) (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.24)     
DUALCEOt -0.0039 -0.0072 -0.0055 -0.0086     
 (-0.54) (-1.16) (-0.75) (-1.14)     
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TAXPREFERENCEt -0.0678*** -0.0656*** -0.0699*** -0.0683***     
 (-14.41) (-14.71) (-14.13) (-12.28)     
EITRATEt–1     0.5082*** 0.4630*** 0.5020*** 0.4605*** 
     (17.82) (15.10) (17.41) (14.85) 
BTRATEt–1     0.2188* 0.1433 0.2167* 0.1433 
     (1.85) (1.07) (1.84) (1.07) 
VATRATEt–1     -0.0099 -0.0125 -0.0085 -0.0108 
     (-0.19) (-0.21) (-0.16) (-0.18) 
SEOt     -0.0218*** -0.0342*** -0.0207*** -0.0342*** 
     (-5.27) (-7.49) (-5.45) (-7.49) 
COMPt–1     0.0275 -0.0057 0.0282 -0.0052 
     (1.32) (-0.27) (1.36) (-0.25) 
BIGNt     -0.0061 -0.0008 -0.0047 -0.0002 
     (-1.37) (-0.15) (-1.05) (-0.03) 
TARGET_INDUSt–1     0.0124* 0.0145* 0.0124* 0.0144* 
     (1.88) (1.74) (1.87) (1.72) 
TAX_AUDITt–1     0.3728* 0.3329 0.3729* 0.3290 
     (1.65) (1.26) (1.66) (1.25) 
LAWt–1     0.0003 0.0012* 0.0002 0.0012* 
     (0.58) (1.85) (0.41) (1.84) 
SEGMENTt     0.0013 -0.0003 0.0013 -0.0003 
     (1.28) (-0.28) (1.32) (-0.27) 
         
Constant 0.4058*** 0.5348*** 0.4331*** 0.5789*** 0.0243 0.1313*** 0.0102 0.1295*** 
 (5.96) (8.56) (5.72) (5.60) (0.55) (2.66) (0.23) (2.62) 
         
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,850 7,609 7,850 7,609 8,786 8,563 8,786 8,563 
Adjusted R
2
 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.10 
         
This table reports the OLS estimation results of Bradshaw et al.’s (2018) ETR model over our sample period. The t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm clustering. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. SOE is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
firm is controlled by the state, and zero otherwise. EQUOFFER is an indicator variable for seasonal equity offerings in a year. CROSSLIST is an indicator variable for firms 
that are also cross-listed in both A-share and H-Share stock markets. MGMTOWN is an indicator variable equal to one if the management has equity ownership, and zero 
otherwise. OWNCONCEN is the ownership percentage of the largest shareholder. DUALCEO is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of directors, and zero otherwise. TAXPREFERENCE is an indicator variable for firms that potentially enjoy a preferential tax rate. Three major types of firms enjoy 
preferential tax rates: 1) firms domiciled in special locations, including hi-tech industry development zones and economic development zones (that sometimes receive 
preferential tax rates); 2) firm-years with foreign ownership that are eligible for preferential tax rates; 3) observations of firms younger than three years (that receive special 
deductions for start-up expenses). We omitted the variable R&D (research and development expense divided by total assets) because it requires hand collection. See the 
appendix for all other variable definitions.  
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